Volume 55

Issue 1

Article 5

December 1952

Transferee Liability--A Capital Loss
William T. Lively Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons

Recommended Citation
William T. Lively Jr., Transferee Liability--A Capital Loss, 55 W. Va. L. Rev. (1952).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss1/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository
@ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Lively: Transferee Liability--A Capital Loss
COMMENTS
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY-A CAPITAL LOSS
WILLIAM T. LIVELY, JR.*

A short time ago the writer was asked to represent a client
who had undergone an agent's examination and had been informed by the agent that adjustments would be proposed which
would result in a sizeable tax deficiency for the years 1949 and
1950. Through usual procedure, the taxpayer client received a
copy of the report of the examining agent, along with the "80 day
letter", and a timely protest was filed by the writer., A conference
in regard to this liability was held with a representative of the internal revenue agent in charge, and, since the taxpayer was satisfied with the outcome of this hearing, a settlement was reached
and the remaining deficiency paid.
Among the agent's findings excepted to by the taxpayer was
one which especially interested the writer and although the conclusions arrived at by the taxpayer and the conferee were exactly
opposite, no definite agreement as to the solution was reached
between the parties. A very recent decision by the United States
Supreme Court has decided the matter in favor of the Treasury
in an opinion which the writer feels is questionable, this feeling
being substantiated by three dissents therein.
The facts in the local case were as follows. In 1935 "The
XYZ Club", a West Virginia corporation, purchased at public sale
approximately 3,760 acres of land in Upshur, Webster, and Randolph Counties. On March 1, 1941, "The XYZ Club" conveyed
the remainder of the lands, after some sales had been made, to the
taxpayer, its sole stockholder, and on the same day the corporation
was dissolved. In 1946 the taxpayer sold the land for an approximate $10,000 overall gain, which was reported by the taxpayer
on his 1946 return as a long term capital gain, and taxes were paid
accordingly. In 1949 the original grantor to "The XYZ Club" entered suit against the corporation and the taxpayer for an accounting of the proceeds received in the sale in 1946, on the ground that
the grantor had received insufficient notice of the sale. The circuit court of Kanawha County, in January, 1950, ruled that the
*Member of the Kanawha County bar.
14 CCH 1952 Fan. TAx REP. f14117 (5).
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defendant taxpayer should repay unto the original grantor the
gain realized on the sale. The taxpayer, after complying with the
order, deducted the $10,000 on his 1950 return, in full, as an ordinary loss under Section 23 (e) (2)2 of the Internal Revenue Code.
It was the Bureau's contention, however, that the loss was a long
3
term capital loss under Sections 23 (g) (1),
and 117 (a) (5),4 and
deductible only to the extent allowed under Section 117 (d) (2) 5 of
the Internal Revenue Code. Since the taxpayer had no capital
gains against which to apply the deduction, and since the deduction, if the government prevailed, could only be taken into account
to the extent of fifty per cent,6 the nature of this loss was of utmost
importance.
The facts seemed to be of first impression. Since the gain
2 INT.

REV. CODE § 23. "Deductions from Gross Income.

"(e) Losses by Individuals.-In the case of an individual, losses sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise"(2) if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not
connected with the trade or business; ....
sINT. REv. CODE § 23. "Deductions from Gross Income.
"(g) Capital Losses.(1) Limitation.-Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall
be allowed only to the extent provided in section 117."
4 INT. REV. CODE § 117. "Capital Gains and Losses.
"(a) Definitions.-As used in this chapter"(5) Long-term capital loss.-The term 'long-term capital loss' means
loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6
months, if and to the extent such loss is taken into account in computing
net income; ......
5 INT. REV. CODE § 117. "Capital Gains and Losses.
"(d) Limitation on Capital Losses."(2) Other taxpayers.-In the case of a taxpayer, other than a corporation, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only
to the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges, plus the net
income of the taxpayer of $1,000, whichever is smaller ......
6 INT. REV. CODE § 117 (b). Section 322 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1951
provides that the 50% limitation no longer applies. Under the new law,
however, as under the prior law, net capital losses, whether long or short term,
may be used to offset only $1,000 of ordinary income, and the unused net loss
may be carried forward as a short term capital loss in the five succeeding
years under Section 117 (e) (1). It is well to remember, however, that a capital
loss carry-over from the calendar year 1951 or before will be computed under
the old law, and capital loss carry-overs for the calendar year 1952 or for any
taxable year beginning on or after the date of enactment of the 1951 Act, will
be computed under the new law.
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realized on the sale was taxable as capital gain, it should follow
that a refund of the same money by a court order resulted in a
capital loss. The key to the matter, however, lies in the definition
of a short term capital loss," and a long term capital loss,8 as defined in the Internal Revenue Code." It will be noted by the
definition of such losses that, in order for a transaction to be
treated as a long term or short term capital loss, there must be a
sale or exchange.'0
Until recently the leading case", analogous to the factual
situation presented above bore this out, and hence should be
closely studied. Four taxpayers were stockholders in X corporation which began liquidation in 1941. Each of the taxpayer's
pro rata share of the liquidating distribution was correctly reported as long term capital gain for the taxable year 1941.12 In 1942
the Bureau made a determination of income tax deficiencies against
the corporation for the years 1940 and 1941. Since the corporation
could not pay the deficiencies, the four taxpayers did pay as transferees of the corporate assets, and each deducted the amount paid
as an ordinary loss in the year 1944 under Code Section 23 (e) (2).Y'
7INT. REV. CODE §

"(a)

117. "Capital Gains and Losses.

Definitions.-As used in this chapter-

"(3) Short-term capital loss.-The term 'short-term capital loss' means
loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for not more than 6
months, if and to the extent such loss is taken into account in computing
net income; ......
8 See note 4 supra.
9 It is to be noted that INT. REv. CODE § 117 does not provide for any additional losses. An individual is allowed to deduct a loss only if it comes
within Section 23(e). Section 117 merely determines whether a loss of an
individual that is allowable under Section 23 (e) is to be taken as a capital
loss or an ordinary loss.
10 Several sections of the Internal Revenue Code provide that transactions
which are not in fact sales or exchanges will be treated as though they were.
They are as follows:
117 (t) redemption of bonds;
23 (g) stock and rights which have become worthless;
23 (k) (2) debts evidenced by securities which have become worthless;
23 (k) (4) non-business bad debts;
115 (c) amounts distributed in complete or partial liquidation of a corporation;
115 (d) certain corporate distributions.
"I Stanley Switlik, 13 T.C. 121 (1949) (Non-Aq. 1949-2 CuNf. BUL. 6).
12 INT. RFv. CODE § 115 (c) states that generally distributions in liquidation
are considered as amounts received in exchange for the stock and therefore
treated as a capital gain.
13 See note 2 supra.
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The commissioner contended that the amount of the deficiencies
were capital losses because the payments by the taxpayers grew out
of, were related to, and took their character from a capital transaction and therefore should be subjected to the same limitations
as the original transactions (i.e., the liquidation). The court held
for the taxpayer, saying:
"The losses they sustained were not, however, capital
losses, as they were not losses from the sale or exchange of
capital assets .....
.and this is true even though the transferee liability which occasioned the losses arose out of distributions which resulted in capital gains in 1941."
The court went on to say that the sale or exchange had occurred
in 1941 and not 1944. The losses were therefore held to be ordinary losses.
Judge Disney dissented, writing a very persuasive opinion,
and, among other things, said:
"Inquiry must be made into the character of the loss and
such inquiry divulges the fact that it arises as a consequence
of a distribution in complete liquidation in 1941 . . . . In
seeking the nature of the loss we may, and should, ascribe to it
the same character as that from which it arose, to-wit, the
capital transaction in the corporate distribution . . . .In the
taxable year here involved it is claimed as a loss, but this claim
cannot conceal the fact that it represents merely diminution
in the capital gain received on the distribution in the earlier
year."
The case was subsequently appealed to the third circuit court
of appeals and the decision was affirmed. 14 It is interesting to note
that in the appeal the commissioner shifted his argument.' 5 It
was his position that since only fifty per cent of the capital gain
on the liquidation dividend was taken into account in 1941, to
allow the Oeduction of the full amount of the payments in 1944,
assumes that they are chargeable wholly to the portion of the
capital gain taken into account in 1941. But the third circuit
agreed with the Tax Court on the theory that the capital transaction was concluded in 1941, and since there was no sale or ex14 Comm'r v. Switlik, 184 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1950).
15 For the general rule in regard to raising an issue for the first time in the

court of appeals, see Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941).
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change in 1944, the loss was deductible in full as an ordinary loss.
The court felt that it was obliged to follow the language of the
Internal Revenue Code in requiring that there be a sale or exchange before the capital loss provisions applied. Since the Switlik
case the Tax Court has consistently followed its holding in
analogous factual situations, 8 but the commissioner refused to
acquiesce' 7 and has continued to disallow this deduction as an
ordinary loss. As will be seen from a study of the cases, the commissioner's argument has consistently been that the subsequent
payments by the transferees represent merely a diminution of the
capital gain received by the taxpayers at the time of corporate
liquidation. This follows the theory advanced by Judge Disney
in his dissent in the Switlik case.
The second circuit court of appeals recently decided two
cases' 8 exactly contra to the Tax Court and the third circuit and
flatly stated that it did not agree with the Switlik decision. The
second circuit reversed the Tax Court in the Bauer and Milliken
cases' 9 on the theory that the liabilities of the taxpayers as transferees represented diminution of the capital gain received on the
distribution and were therefore capital losses. The court adopted
the argument of Judge Disney and the commissioner where there
was no distinguishable factual difference in the cases from the
Switlik decision.20
The Tax Court originally based its Swvitlik decision on a

16 Frederick R. Bauer, 15 T.C. 876 (1950); Seth M. Milliken, 15 T.C. 243
(1950); Frederick M. Paist, 10 T.C.M. 967 (1951); Tatem Wofford, 10 T.C.M.
692 (1951); and Lamar D. and Minnie Rhea Fain, 11 T.C.M. 11 (1952). The
Switlik case was also followed by a district court of the United States in Clifton
v. Allen, 101 F.Supp. 997 (D.C. Ga. 1952).
'- 1949-2 CuM. BuLL.4.
1s Comm'r v. Bauer, et ux., 193 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1952). and Milliken v.
Comm'r, 196 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1952).
19 See notes 16 and 18 supra.
20 In the Bauer case the taxpayers had been required in 1944 to pay a
judgment obtained against a corporation liquidated in 1940. Taxpayers sought
to deduct this payment as an ordinary loss. The Milliken case was similar to
the Switlik case in that the taxpayers had paid taxes owed by a liquidated corporation. In both decisions the second circuit held that these payments were
deductible only as capital losses. Concerning the Milliken case, Judge Clark
said, "Our theory was in short that the payment operated to reduce the
amounts received in the corporation liquidation and were more properly considered as a loss suffered in the return of capital or as a reduction of the
capital gain, rather than as an ordinary hardship of business."
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series of cases handed down by the United States Supreme Court.2 '
The importance of these cases on the factual situation presented
can be seen from the fact that the Tax Court cited and based its
decision in the Switlik case on the North American Oil case, 2 and
the second circuit in the Bauer case recognized the rule of the
North American Oil case as well settled, but distinguished the
Bauer case. The rule as such was first brought out in Burnet z,.
Sanford Se Brooksz 3 wherein it was held that reimbursement of
losses sustained in prior years was income to the taxpayer in the
year of reimbursement. In the North American Oil case 4 it was
stated that "if a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right
and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still be
claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even
though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent."
This theory or rule has become known as "the single year as the
unit of taxation" rule and has been affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court as late as March 26, 1951.2- The Tax Court and
the third circuit cited the North American Oil case with approval
and contended that their respective decisions in the Switlik case
were in line with that decision. The second circuit, in the
Bauer case, agreed with the rule of the North American Oil case,
and admitted that the rule was well settled, but stated that the decision of the Supreme Court in the North American Oil case did
not mean that an examination of the previous year's return could
not be made so as to determine the "nature" of the "new fact" in
order to determine how a gain or loss was to be "categorized" in
computing taxable income for the year in which the new fact happened. The court then went on to say that in the Bauer case, con-

2iBurnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931); North American
Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932), and United States v. Lewis,

340 U.S. 590 (1951).

See note 21 supra.
23 See note 21 supra.
2' See note 21 supra.
25 United States v. Lewis, note 21 supra. In this case a taxpayer who re22

ported a bonus as income in the year received, and who later was forced to
return it, was not allowed to recompute his earlier tax liability. It was stated
that the repayment, however, could be taken as a loss deduction in the year of
repayment.
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sidering the events of the previous year and of the taxable year the
losses in the taxable year did arise out of a sale or exchange.
Another case bearing strongly on the subject matter is the
famous Dobson case.z Although susequent to the North American
Oil case, the opinion does not cite or refer to the "single year as
the unit of taxation rule". It does establish a principle, however,
which seems to be in addition to or superimposed upon the unit
theory. The principle as stated by Justice Jackson is that "not
every gain growing out of a transaction concerning capital assets
is allowed the benefits of the capital gains tax provision. They
are limited by definition to gains from the sale or exchange of
capital assets." Strangely enough the Dobson case was not mentioned in the majority opinion of the Tax Court in the Switlik
case though it was cited with approval by the third circuit. The
second circuit did not cite the Dobson case in its opinions in the
Bauer and Milliken cases, but Judge Disney, in his dissent in the
Switlik case, attempted to distinguish the Dobson case by saying
that in the Dobson case there was no "intimate relation" between
the original transaction and the later payment of the tax as there
was in the Switlik case. The writer submits that what is meant by
the words "intimate relation" as used by Judge Disney, if used as
a test, would only lead to further costly litigation in determining
when such relation existed.
On November 19, 1951, the Tax Court decided the Mace
Osenbach case. 7 This case is hard to contrast with the Switlik
and Bauer decisions due to the fact that a special code section was
in issue-1 12 (b) (7). But the opinion was written by Judge Disney
and his wording is interesting indeed. In that case the taxpayer
was a stockholder in a corporation which liquidated in one month
under the provisions of Section 112 (b) (7). The taxpayer had received in kind certain loans, discounts, mortgages, and other
claims. Collections were subsequently made on these assets and
2 Dobson v. Comm'r. 320 U.S. 489, 321 U.S. 231 (1944).
The facts generally
were as follows: The taxpayer in 1929 acquired some stock from the National
City Company. In 1930 and 1931 the taxpayer sold some of the stock and
sustained deductible losses. In 1936 he learned of facts indicating that he had
been induced to purchase the stock by fraudulent representations, and he filed
suit against the seller. In 1939 the taxpayer was given a recovery allocable to
the stock sold in 1930 and 1931. The Court held that the recovery in 1939 was
taxable as ordinary income.

27

17 T.C. 797 (1952).
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the question arose as to how these collections were to be returnedas capital gain or ordinary income. Judge Disney stated that the
liquidation was a dosed matter and that in order for capital gain
rates to apply there must be a sale or exchange, and since there
was no sale or exchange the collections were taxable as ordinary
income. Applying the rule of the Dobson case, and the single year
as the unit of taxation theory, this case seems to be correctly
decided, but applying the reasoning of Judge Disney's dissent in
the Switlik case there seems to be a closer "intimate relation" in
the Osenbach case than in the Switlik case, which relation would
render the collections taxable as capital gain. In the Osenbach
case, which has been appealed by the taxpayer to the fourth circuit
court of appeals, it was held that the nature of the gain depended
upon the facts concerning the subsequent gain realizing transaction
and was not dependent at all upon the nature of the prior transaction.
It is interesting to note that in one case2s decided by the Tax
Court, the taxpayer tried to argue exactly what the government
in effect advocates in the Switlik line of cases, i.e., the payment of
a subsequent tax deficiency represents mere diminution in the
capital gain received in the earlier year. In 1947 the taxpayer paid
a deficiency as transferee of a corporation liquidated in 1945. The
government refused to allow the taxpayer to reduce the gain on
the liquidation of the corporation by the amount of the taxes on
the 1945 income of the corporation paid by the petitioner as transferee in 1947. The court held for the government and said:
"If the petitioner's contention that the capital gain should be
adjusted were to be followed, the result would be to hold in
abeyance the final determination of the capital gain on a corporate dissolution until the final corporate income tax had
28 Roberta Pittman, 14 T.C. 449 (1950). See also Estate of Hetty B. Levy,
et al., 17 T.C. 731 (1952). See also the decision of the second circuit in Comm'r
v. Hartfield, et al., 194 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1952). In the Hartfield case the taxpayers had received $30,000 in 1945 as salary from a corporation wholly owned
by them, and that sum was reported on their individual returns for that year
and a tax paid accordingly. The Commissioner subsequently disallowed the
corporation as a deduction, $10,000 of the $30,000 paid, and the taxpayers as
transferees paid the resulting deficiency for the corporation in 1947. The
taxpayers then sought a refund for their individual overpayment of taxes in
1945. The court held that a refund could not be obtained and affirmed the
claim of right theory as set out in the North American Oil and Lewis cases,

supra note 21.
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been paid. This would place an unwarranted burden on the
tax collection process."
From these cases it would seem that this fairly common factual
occurrence had no ready tax answer. But due to the square conflict between circuits the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Bauer case,2 9 and on November 10, 1952, 80 handed down its decision
affirming the second circuit and overruling the Switlik decision by
inference. 31 The majority opinion was written by Justice Black
with Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissenting. Indeed
the simplicity of the majority opinion, which cites only three cases
in support thereof, lends credence to the thoughts expressed in
the dissenting opinions. For example, after stating the facts,
Justice Black writes that "I. R. C. § 23 treats losses from sales or
exchanges of capital assets as 'capital losses,'" whereas a careful
study of § 23 would show that that section has nothing to do with
the treatment of capital losses other than to say that they "shall
be allowed [as deductions] only to the extent provided in section
117." It is Sections 117 (a) (3) and 117 (a) (5) 32 which define capital
losses and treat them as such.
The majority opinion seems to base its decision on the premise
that had the liabilities of the taxpayers as transferees occurred
during the same taxable year as the liquidation, there would be
no question that the loss would have been properly treated as a
capital loss and the payment of the liability would simply have
reduced the amount of capital gain the taxpayers received during
that year. Justice Jackson in his dissent effectively answers this
argument by pointing out that the adoption of the decision of the
majority penalizes the taxpayer because of two factors:
"(1) Since capital losses are deductible only against capital
gains, plus $1,000, a taxpayer having no net capital gains in the
ensuing five years would have no opportunity to deduct anything beyond $5,000; and
"(2) had the liability been discharged by the corporation, a
portion of it would probably in effect have been paid by
the Government, since the corporation could have taken it as
29 72 Sup. Ct. 1075 (1952).
30 Arrowsmith et aL. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 73 Sup. Ct. 71 (1952).
31For a short statement of the facts in the Arrowsmith case, see note 20
su tra.
32 See notes 4 and 7 supra.
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a deduction, while here the total liability comes out of the
pockets of ihe stockholders."
The majority opinion also states that the annual unit of taxation rule is not breached by considering the liquidation events in
order to properly classify the nature of the 1944 loss for tax purposes.
But Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion says that there were
no capital transactions in the year in which the losses were suffered
and since it is the law that each year is a separate unit for tax
accounting, then that law should be observed, regardless of who
may gain or lose from it in a particular case. The Dobson and
Osenbach cases are examples of situations where, under the majority
opinion, the taxpayers would benefit from the rule of the Arrowsmith case.
The decision in the Arrowsmith case indicates a probable need
for new legislation. It is very difficult to reconcile this new decision
with the Dobson, North American, and Lewis cases, and the principles they establish. This is not to say that the Arrowsmith case
is incorrectly decided on principle, several writers having already
expressed agreement,33 but it seems to qualify, if not overrule,
several precedents established by the Supreme Court itself. The
opinion does not go far enough and it seems to create an alluring
loophole which Congress might wish to dose.
33 See Schwartz, Transferee Liability Following Corporate Liquidation; The
Income Tax Consequences to the Former Stockholders, 7 TAx L. Rtv. 504 (1952).
Also, see Mandel, Not a Gain Again, Again and Again, 30 TAxs 433 (1952).
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